More Questions Than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing Regulatory Takings Doctrine by Kent, Michael B., Jr.
Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2011
More Questions Than Answers: Situating Judicial
Takings Within Existing Regulatory Takings
Doctrine
Michael B. Kent Jr.
Campbell University School of Law, mkent@campbell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Michael B. Kent Jr., More Questions Than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 Va. Envtl.
L.J. 143 (2011).
ARTICLE
MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS:
SITUATING JUDICIAL TAKINGS WITHIN EXISTING
REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
Michael B. Kent, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, a four-member plurality
of the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that certain judicial
action, as well as action by other branches of government,
might effect a taking of private property. In explaining its
theory of judicial takings, however, the plurality did little to
explain how such takings fit within the larger doctrinal and
analytical framework for regulatory takings. This Article
evaluates whether the plurality's discussion of judicial tak-
ings is consistent with the preexisting takings framework and
how it might impact takings cases in the future. Ultimately,
the plurality's discussion of judicial takings raises more
questions than answers and backtracks on the promises of
clarity made in the Court's most recent prior takings
decision.
INTRODUCTION..... .................................... 144
I. LINGLE AND ExISTING REGULATORY TAKINGS
DOCTRINE ............................................. 146
A. The Litigation in Lingle ...................... 147
B. The Lingle Analytical Framework .............. 148
II. STOP THE BEACH AND THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL
TAKINGS .......................................... 150
A. A Brief History of Judicial Takings ............. 151
B. The Stop the Beach Litigation .................. 152
C. Justice Scalia's Opinion.............. ......... 154
* Associate Professor of Law, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. I would like to
thank Ben Barros, Brannon Denning, and John Echeverria for their comments on earlier
drafts.
Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 29:143
III. LINGLE, STOP THE BEACH, AND THE FUTURE OF
TAKINGS LAw ......................................... 156
A. The Relationship Between Judicial and Regulatory
Takings ............................... 157
B. How Do Judicial Takings Fit Within the Lingle
Analyses? ............................... 160
C. Implications for Future Cases....... ......... 166
CONCLUSION ................................................. 168
INTRODUCTION
Much of the discussion surrounding the Supreme Court's 2009-
2010 term has centered on the First and Second Amendments to
the United States Constitution.' For those of us who follow takings
doctrine, however, the Court's decision in Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection2
was equally as interesting and, perhaps, just as significant as the
developments in those other constitutional areas. In Stop the
Beach, a four-member plurality endorsed the idea that actions of
the judicial branch, no less than those of the legislative and execu-
tive branches, can effect an uncompensated taking of property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 In the words
of Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, "the Takings Clause bars
the State from taking private property without paying for it, no
matter which branch is the instrument of the taking."'
The plurality's doctrine of judicial takings presents a host of
interesting questions.5 As an initial matter, given that only four
Justices explicitly endorsed the doctrine, threshold inquiries
I See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3021-23 (2010) (holding that the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable to states); Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment pro-
hibits government from suppressing political speech by corporations); see also Michael S.
Kang, After Citizens United, 44 INo. L. Riiv. 243 (2010) (discussing the shift in direction in
campaign finance); Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago:
Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws? 104 Nw. U. L. Riy. Col.-
LoQuY 85 (2010) (finding that although McDonald makes clear that the Second Amend-
ment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, there is still significant
debate about what standard of scrutiny applies to gun laws by state and local
governments).
2 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (plurality opinion).
3 See id. at 7-10.
4 Id. at 10.
s Some Supreme Court precedent prior to Stop the Beach supports the theory of judicial
takings. Nonetheless, the Court's previous pronouncements related to this issue were by
no means clear, and Stop the Beach rightly may be considered the most authoritative state-
ment on the subject from the modern Court. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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include both its durability and the precise analytical standards for
evaluating future claims.6 Another important issue concerns the
proper role of federal courts in evaluating the property-related rul-
ings of state tribunals, along with the federalism implications nec-
essarily wrapped up in such a task.' By not providing clear,
majority answers to these questions, the decision in Stop the Beach
does little to alleviate the famous murkiness of takings law.8
This lack of clarity, while not entirely unexpected, is nonetheless
disappointing given the Court's recent movements in this area. In
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,9 issued just five years before Stop
the Beach, the Court made what many commentators (myself
included) considered to be great strides toward shoring up the con-
fusion surrounding regulatory takings.' 0 In light of that progress,
the unanswered questions about judicial takings seem to present
something of a setback. So, too, does the plurality's sparse discus-
sion of how judicial takings fit within the-framework established by
Lingle. Indeed, the meager references to the Lingle framework in
Stop the Beach have led one knowledgeable commenter to query
whether Justice Scalia's plurality opinion "indicat[es] his personal
preference for jettisoning most of established precedent" or,
instead, whether "judicial takings are different and should be sub-
jected to a different and higher standard."" Put differently, do
judicial takings as explained by the plurality in Stop the Beach fit
6 See D. Benjamin Barros, Supreme Court Rules in Stop the Beach, PROPERTYPROF
BLOG, June 17, 2010, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2010/06/supreme-court-
rules-in-stop-the-beach.html.
7 Compare, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 ("Generally speaking, state law
defines property interests.") with id. at 2609 (acknowledging that federal courts must "have
the power to decide what property rights exist under state law"); see also id. at 2608 n.9
(indicating that federal courts should make independent judgment concerning existence of
constitutional violation but show deference to state court determination of property rights
at issue).
8 See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENvt. L.J. 63, 63 (2008) (collecting
quotes that describe regulatory takings law as "'muddled,' 'confused,' and 'a constitutional
quagmire"').
9 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
10 See, e.g., Kent, supra note 8, at 107 (positing that Lingle "begins the long overdue
process of bringing clarity to the confused realm of regulatory takings"); see also D. Benja-
min Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron
and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 Amn. L. REV. 343, 344
(2005) (suggesting that Lingle "has tremendous potential to clarify takings doctrine");
Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings
Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 371, 372 (2006) ("Lingle brings a remarkable coher-
ence to the Court's confused regulatory takings doctrine.").
11 Posting of John Echeverria to PropertyProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
property/2010/06/supreme-court-rules-in-stop-the-beach.html (June 21, 2010, 10:00 EST).
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within the larger understanding of takings endorsed by Lingle, and
if so, how?
This Article explores these latter questions and, in the process,
raises several subordinate issues implicated by the Stop the Beach
plurality. It should be stated at the outset that my aim is not to
critique the doctrine of judicial takings per se - that is, I do not
address whether the plurality is right or wrong that certain types of
judicial action may effect a taking of private property. Rather,
assuming that judicial takings are viable, it is my aim to evaluate
how the plurality's discussion of such takings might impact the
existing framework for regulatory takings established in Lingle. To
that end, Part I, drawing heavily from my observations in prior
work, reviews the existing doctrine of regulatory takings as devel-
oped in Lingle. Part II then examines the plurality's decision in
Stop the Beach and its theory of the doctrine of judicial takings.
Part III attempts to fit Stop the Beach within the Lingle framework,
while simultaneously drawing attention to potential inconsistencies
between that framework and the plurality's explanation of judicial
takings. I conclude that the theory of judicial takings endorsed by
the Stop the Beach plurality raises more questions than it helps to
answer and, in the process, has backtracked on the promises of
clarity made in Lingle.
I. LINGLE AND EXISTING REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE12
As suggested above, for several decades, the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence was an amalgam of confusion and
conflict. Beginning in 1978, with its decision in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York," the Court spent the better part
of three decades formulating a variety of analytical tests by which
to judge takings claims, and in so doing, it provided a number of
seemingly incompatible explanations about how subordinate issues
within those tests should be resolved.14 Additionally, throughout
its decisions, the Court utilized language, principles, and prece-
dents that seemed to incorporate elements of substantive due pro-
cess into the law of takings." The result of this conflation with due
12 The following discussion is based on Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and
Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L.
Rinv. 1833, 1841-44 (2010) and Kent, supra note 8, at 78-109.
13 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14 See generally Kent, supra note 8, at 66-84 (discussing pre-Lingle takings cases).
15 See id. at 68-69; see also Barros, supra note 10, at 349-50, 351 (noting that "older
cases ... have problematic substantive due process baggage" and that "many of the Court's
[Vol. 29:143146
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process was a misplaced emphasis on the purposes for which a
challenged regulation had been enacted, as well as a lack of pre-
dictability as to the likely outcome of any particular case.1 6 In
2005, however, the Court brought some welcome clarity to this
area of constitutional inquiry with its unanimous decision in Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc."
A. The Litigation in Lingle
Lingle concerned a challenge to a Hawaii statute that limited the
amount of rent an oil company could charge to independent lessees
of company-owned gasoline stations.' The law was ostensibly
enacted to protect lessees from the effects of market concentration
and, concomitantly, allow the lessees to lower the retail prices they
charged for gasoline.' 9 Pointing to evidence that the rent control
measure would not serve its stated purpose, and indeed would
actually result in higher retail gasoline prices, 2 0 Chevron chal-
lenged the law as an uncompensated taking of its property. 21
The Supreme Court rejected Chevron's claim on the grounds
that the basis for its challenge - i.e., that the statute did not serve
its stated purpose - was not a cognizable argument under the Tak-
ings Clause. Noting that Chevron's challenge really was about the
underlying legitimacy of the rent cap, and not about the cap's effect
on its property interests, the Court indicated that the claim was
grounded more in substantive due process than in the law of tak-
ings. 2 2 The former properly is concerned with the purposes and
validity of government action, and a law that is sufficiently arbi-
trary or irrational will be held invalid.2 3
The Takings Clause, by contrast, is not concerned with the
underlying validity of the government action, but rather "presup-
poses that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public
purpose." 24 Instead, the Takings Clause is primarily concerned
more recent regulatory takings precedents ... have [also] been infected with substantive
due process analysis").
16 See Kent, supra note 8, at 77.
17 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
18 Id. at 533.
19 Id. at 533-34.
20 Id. at 535.
21 Id. at 533.
22 Id. at 540-45.
23 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); see also id. at 548-49 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 543.
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with the idea of fair burden distribution - in other words, whether
the government is "forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole." 2 5 The paradigmatic case of such unfair distribution
is where the government directly appropriates private property via
eminent domain.26 Because such property is seized for the public
good, it is only fitting that the government (as representative of the
public) compensate the owner for the property that was seized.
Similarly, government actions short of direct appropriation, but
that are "functionally equivalent" to it, also require the payment of
compensation.2 8 Ultimately, then, the Takings Clause focuses not
on the purposes or validity of the government action, but "upon
the severity of the burden that [such action] imposes upon private
property rights." 29
B. The Lingle Analytical Framework
After explaining the differences between due process and tak-
ings, and overruling some prior precedent that overtly confused the
two, the Court then put its imprimatur on five of its prior regula-
tory takings decisions30 - Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 31 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,33 Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,34 and Dolan v. City of Tigard." I have
argued elsewhere that these decisions, along with Lingle itself,
should be considered uniquely authoritative in the area of regula-
tory takings.3 6 Reading these six decisions together, as if they
formed a single, unified text, a strong case can be made that there
are two basic analyses for evaluating takings claims. Each analysis,
at its essence, is designed to determine whether a government
action so onerously burdens the owner's core property rights of
25 Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 539.
29 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
30 Id. at 548.
31 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
32 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
33 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
34 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
35 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
36 See Kent, supra note 8, at 65, 84.
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exclusion, use, possession, and disposition that it should be deemed
the functional equivalent of a direct appropriation or ouster.
The first analysis, which I have labeled the "standard analysis,"
involves three primary steps. "First, this framework asks whether
the challenger can prove that the regulation at issue required a per-
manent physical invasion or occupation of his property."" If the
answer to this question is "yes," then the regulation results in a
taking, regardless of the size of the invasion, the regulation's eco-
nomic impact, or the public purposes for which the regulation was
promulgated. If the answer to this question is "no," however,
then the analysis moves to a second inquiry - i.e., "whether the
challenger can prove that the regulation deprived him of all benefi-
cial or productive economic use of his property." 4 0 Where the
challenger can prove such a deprivation, then the regulation is pre-
sumed to constitute a taking, and the burden is shifted to the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the regulation does no more than
what could be accomplished under the law of nuisance or other
"background principles" of property law.4 1 If the government fails
to make this showing, the presumption of taking stands. On the
other hand, where the government rebuts the presumption, the
analysis moves to a final step, which examines how closely the reg-
ulation resembles both a permanent physical invasion and a total
economic deprivation. 4 2 This examination is conducted by consid-
ering two factors: "(1) the economic impact of the regulation in
light of the owner's distinct, investment-backed expectations; and
(2) the character of the governmental action."4 3
The "standard analysis"-applies to the majority of takings claims.
A second analysis, however, applies to the unique context of land
use exactions. This "exactions analysis" also involves three pri-
mary steps, and like the "standard analysis," is designed to ferret
out those government actions that are functionally equivalent to a
direct appropriation but for which no compensation has been pro-
vided. The initial step in the analysis is to identify the government
interest at issue and ask whether it would be sufficient to deny the
challenger's proposed land use altogether.4 4 In reality, this step
37 Id. at 89-94.
38 Kent, supra note 12, at 1842.
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1843.
43 Kent, supra note 12, at 1843.
44 Id.
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appears to be nothing more than an analytical placeholder
designed to force the government to name some interest; in both of
its two exaction decisions, the Court has simply assumed that the
interest offered by the government is sufficient.4 5 Once the inter-
est is identified, the next step is to determine whether there is an
"essential nexus" between that interest and the exaction being
demanded of the property owner.4 6 Where no such nexus exists, a
compensable taking has occurred. Where the required nexus is
established, however, the analysis moves to the final step, which
tests whether the demanded exaction bears a "rough proportional-
ity" to the impact that the proposed land use project is expected to
have on the interest identified by the government.47 To be roughly
proportional, the exaction must help alleviate the public harm
expected to result from the proposed land use in an individualized
and quantifiable way.4 8
These two analyses - along with Lingle's focus on "functional
equivalence," its emphasis on core property rights, and its discon-
nection of due process principles from the takings inquiry - did
much to bring clarity and certainty to regulatory takings doctrine.
Although Lingle did not answer all of the questions about regula-
tory takings, 49 it provided some much needed guidance and, for
this reason, has been hailed as a watershed event in takings law.o
II. STOP THE BEACH AND THE THEORY OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS
All of the cases endorsed by Lingle, as well as Lingle itself,
involved actions by the executive or legislative branches of govern-
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1843-44.
47 Id. at 1844.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Kent, supra note 8, at 107-09 (discussing some unresolved issues); Kent,
supra note 12, at 1891-93 (same).
50 In addition to my own work cited above, see, e.g., Barros, supra note 10, at 356 (sug-
gesting that "Lingle has tremendous potential to clarify regulatory takings law"); J. Peter
Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After Lingle, 34 EcoiLOGY L.Q. 471, 471 (2007)
(describing Lingle as having "greatly clarified" the "constitutional law of land use regula-
tion"); Andrew W. Schwartz, How The Government Can Avoid Property Rights Litigation,
SMO40 ALl-ABA 497, 500 (2007) (describing Lingle as "the most significant regulatory
takings case, and perhaps one of the most important court decisions of the modern era").
This praise has not been universal, however, with some commentators expressly disavow-
ing that Lingle did much to clarify the law of takings. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, 2007 BYU
L. Ruiv. 899, 899-900 (suggesting that Lingle "both exemplified and exacerbated" the inco-
herence of takings law); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings,
28 STAN. ENVI.. L.J. 525, 528-29 (2009) (arguing that elements of Lingle framework, spe-
cifically the "character factor," threaten Lingle's "stability" and "conceptual neatness").
[Vol. 29:143150
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ment. There was no suggestion, one way or the other, as to whether
the actions of judicial officers might also be subject to the Takings
Clause. Nonetheless, the question is not a new one.
A. A Brief History of Judicial Takings51
As early as 1897, the Supreme Court indicated that the Takings
Clause applies "to all the instrumentalities of the state - to its legis-
lative, executive, and judicial authorities,"5 2 and therefore, the
judgment of a state court whereby property is taken is deemed to
be the act of the state for purposes of triggering those protec-
tions." Nonetheless, the case in which these statements were made
did not present the issue of whether judicial changes in the com-
mon law of property could result in a taking.
That issue was taken up eight years later, with nebulous results.
A plurality of four Justices, in an opinion that relied heavily on
Contract Clause principles, suggested that a state court could not
overrule or distinguish prior decisions in a way that eradicated
vested property rights.5 4 Of the remaining members of the Court,
one concurred in the result only,55 and four dissented on the
grounds that the plurality's approach amounted to a gross interfer-
ence with the power of state courts over state property law. 5 6 Sev-
eral decisions from the New Deal era seemed to agree with these
dissenters, and the Court's adventures with the theory of judicial
takings seemed to be over.5 7 Then, in 1967, Justice Stewart resur-
rected the theory in a concurring opinion, declaring that "a State
cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking property without due process of law by the simple device of
asserting retroactively [through a judicial decision] that the prop-
erty it has taken never existed at all."5
In 1973, a majority of the Court cited with approval Justice Stew-
art's concurrence for the proposition that th'e Constitution prohib-
51 See Barton H. Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1463-72 (1990) and
Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings,
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAII L. REv. 379, 425-33, for fuller accounts of the Court's
history with the theory of judicial takings.
52 Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897).
53 Id. at 235.
54 Muhiker v. N.Y. & Harlem R., 197 U.S. 544, 570-71 (1905) (plurality opinion).
55 Id. at 571 (Brown, J., concurring in result).
56 Id. at 571-76 (Holmes, J., joined by Fuller, C.J., White and Peckham, JJ., dissenting).
57 See Thompson, supra note 51, at 1465-67 (discussing cases and commenting that "by
the end of the New Deal, the concept of judicial takings was dead").
58 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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its "confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than through
its legislature."" But the case making that endorsement was over-
ruled four years later.6 0
In 1980, the Court decided two cases that, on their facts, seemed
to involve judicial takings, but in neither case did the Court explic-
itly confront the issue, instead treating both situations like ordinary
takings claims. 6 1 Finally,.in 1994, Justices Scalia and O'Connor
again cited Justice Stewart's concurrence for the proposition that
"[nlo more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State
transform private property into public property without
compensation. "62
B. The Stop the Beach Litigation
As a result, the status of judicial takings doctrine was unclear
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stop the Beach. The
case arose from government efforts to restore eroded beaches in
Walton County, Florida by dredging sand from offshore areas and
depositing it onto the eroded areas.6 3 The restoration proceeded
under a state statute that, among other things, fixed the boundary
line between privately-owned beachfront lots and publicly-owned
restored beaches at an administratively-determined erosion control
line.6 4 Under the statute, this new boundary replaced the ordinary
boundary established by the common law.6 5
Under Florida common law, the boundary between private and
state land is the mean high water line ("MHWL"), which repre-
sents "the average reach of high tide over the preceding 19
years."6 6 Normally, the state owns submerged land seaward of the
MHWL, while the private owner holds title to the dry property
landward of the MHWL.6 7 But this boundary might change as a
result of accretions - i.e., gradual additions of sand and other
59 Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 331 (1973) (citing Hughes, 389 U.S. at 443
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
60 See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 368-
72 (1977).
61 See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162-64 (1980);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980).
62 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
63 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 130 S.Ct. 2592,
2600 (2010).
64 Id. at 2599.
65 Id.
66 Id at 2598.
67 Id.
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deposits that, over time, increase the amount of waterfront land. 8
Under Florida decisional law, the private beachfront owner takes
title to land added to the shoreline by accretion.6 9 On the other
hand, land added as a result of avulsion - i.e., sudden and immedi-
ately perceptible additions - remain titled in the state even though
no longer submerged. 70 The beach restoration statute seemingly
altered these common law principles by effectively doing away with
the private owner's rights of accretion.
A nonprofit corporation established by several beachfront own-
ers objected to the Walton County restoration project, arguing that
the project effected a taking of their properties in two ways.72
First, the owners argued that the restoration statute deprived them
of their common law rights to gain accreted land in the future.
Second, they argued that it also eliminated their additional com-
mon law right to contact with the water.7 4 Although initially suc-
cessful, the owners' challenge ultimately was rejected by the
Florida Supreme Court. In its opinion, a majority of that court
held: (1) that the restoration statute allowed the government to do
nothing more than what was already permitted under the common
law of avulsion; (2) that the doctrine of accretion did not apply to
the context of restored beaches; and (3) that Florida common law
did not recognize any independent right of contact with the
water.
Contending that prior precedent required upholding the owners'
claims, an impassioned dissent accused the majority of having
"butchered" and "simply erased well-established Florida law" in
these areas.7 6 In light of these statements, the owners petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on the
68 Id. at 2598-99.
69 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 2599-60; see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 161.191(2) ("Once the erosion control line
along any segment of the shoreline has been established in accordance with the provisions
of [the restoration statute], the common law shall no longer operate to increase or decrease
the proportions of any upland property lying landward of such line, either by accretion or
erosion or by any other natural or artificial process, except as provided in [the restoration
statute].").
72 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2560.
73 Id. Because the erosion control line had been fixed at the MHWL, the replacement
of the common law boundary with the new statutory boundary did not in itself effect a
taking. See id. at 2599 n.2.
74 Id.
75 walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1116-20 (Fla.
2008).
76 Id. at 1121 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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ground that the state court had ignored and redefined established
precedent to eliminate their property rights, thereby working a
judicial taking."
C. Justice Scalia's Opinion
A plurality of the Court, led by Justice Scalia, gave the owners a
split decision. 8 As an initial matter, the plurality opinion expressly
endorsed the theory of judicial takings, noting that "[t]he Takings
Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or
branches" of government." Thus, whether an uncompensated tak-
ing results from executive, legislative, or judicial action, it violates
the Constitution. 0 For the plurality, this conclusion rested not
only on the constitutional text and prior precedent, but also on
common sense: "It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judi-
cial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative
fiat."81 In other words, no matter which branch is acting, those
actions are attributable to the state for purposes of the takings
protections.8 2
Nonetheless, the plurality conceded that the manner of state
action was not completely irrelevant. The overt use of eminent
domain, for example, always qualifies as a taking, whereas restric-
tions of property occasioned without an outright condemnation
may or may not. And given that courts rarely (if ever) can be
said to possess the affirmative power to initiate condemnation via
eminent domain,84 the real question in the context of an alleged
77 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-33, Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep't
of Envtl. Protection, 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151),.2009 WL 698518.
78 On the issue of whether judicial takings presented a viable theory, the Court divided
into three camps. First, as discussed below, was the plurality of Justice Scalia, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Thomas and Alito. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at
2560 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Second was the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Sotomayor, which preferred to handle judicial decisions that eliminate or
significantly alter preexisting property rights as a violation of the Due Process Clause. See
id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Finally, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg would simply
have held that the state court decision did not amount to a judicial taking if the theory
were viable, without deciding the threshold question. See id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens did not participate in the case.
79 Stop the Beach Renourishrnent, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
80 See id. at 2601-02.
81 Id. at 2601.
82 Id. at 2602.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987); Hoffman Family, LLC v. City of Alexandria, 634 S.E.2d 722, 728 (Va.
2006).
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judicial taking is how to determine when judicial action that
restricts property becomes unconstitutional.
The plurality answered this question, in the, first instance any-
way, by referring to some familiar concepts. Reiterating that the
direct appropriation or transfer of property is the classic example
of a taking, the plurality noted that other actions would also qualify
where they "achieve the same thing" as a direct appropriation or
transfer. Here, the plurality cited Lingle for the proposition that
"our doctrine of regulatory takings 'aims to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking.' "86
The opinion then mentioned the two categorical examples of the
Lingle analytical framework - i.e., permanent physical occupations
and total economic deprivations.87 But according to the plurality,
the present case more closely resembled a different type of prohib-
ited action: "States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public
property what was previously private property."" And in deter-
mining whether a judicial decision falls within this prohibited con-
duct, "[w]hat counts is not whether there is precedent for the
allegedly confiscatory decision, but whether the property right
allegedly taken was established" by prior law.8
Having acknowledged that judicial action can violate the takings
protections, the opinion then considered whether the decision of
the Florida Supreme Court actually had done so. At this point,
Justice Scalia was no longer speaking for a mere plurality, but for a
unanimous Court.90 Focusing on the two rights directly at issue,
the Court held that, to prevail on their claim, the owners must
demonstrate "that, before the Florida Supreme Court's decision,
littoral property owners had rights to future accretions and contact
with the water superior to the State's right to fill in its submerged
land."91 This they could not do. The Court began its analysis by
examining prior Florida law and concluding that the owners' rights
to accretions had not been infringed. This was because previous
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court allowed the state to fill in
its own submerged lands and declared the resulting addition of
85 Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2601.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 2596.
90 All members of the Court that heard the case joined Parts IV and V of Justice Scalia's
opinion, which addressed the issue of whether a judicial taking in fact had occurred. Stop
the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2610-13.
91 Id. at 2611.
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land to be an avulsion, not an accretion.9 2 As a result, any new
land produced by the state's infill efforts would remain titled in the
state, not in the adjacent owner. Once the adjacent owner's land
was removed from contact with the water (a right that the Court
agreed was not independently established by Florida precedent),
there could be no further accretions because there would be no
further fluctuations between dry and submerged land.94
In sum, Justice Scalia's opinion indicated that the theory of judi-
cial takings was viable and that a state judicial decision would vio-
late the Takings Clause where it eliminated property rights
previously established under state law." In the present case, how-
ever, prior law had not established the owners' rights beyond
doubt, and, therefore, no taking had occurred.
III. LINGLE, STOP THE BEACH, AND THE FUTURE
OF TAKINGs LAW
Among the noteworthy characteristics of Justice Scalia's opinion
in Stop the Beach, and one that is of particular significance to this
Article, is its lack of attention to the Lingle framework. The plu-
rality opinion cites Lingle only one time, in reference to the doc-
trine of "functional equivalence." 9 6 Moreover, of the five "special"
opinions endorsed by Lingle, only two are mentioned by the plural-
ity in reference to Lingle's analytical system - Loretto v.
Telepromptor Manhattan CA TV Corp. (regarding permanent phys-
ical invasions) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(regarding total economic deprivations). Remarkably, the only
92 Id. at 2611-12. The Court noted that this result "may seem counterintuitive" and
"there might be different interpretations of . .. Florida property-law cases that would pre-
vent this arguably odd result." Id. at 2612. Nonetheless, the Court was not free to adopt
such alternative interpretations where the state court's own interpretations did not contra-
vene previously established rights. Id. See also id. at 2609 n.9 ("A property right is not
established if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make
our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.").
93 Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2612-13.
94 See id. at 2611 ("[T]here can be no accretions to land that no longer abuts the
water.").
95 See id. at 2612-13.
96 Id. at 2601.
9 Id. Justice Scalia also cited Lucas later in the opinion in finding that the Florida
Supreme Court had acted consistently with "background principles of state property law."
See id. at 2612. The opinion cites Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) for the well-
established proposition that the Takings Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 2597. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) is not cited, although one would not necessarily expect a reference to Nollan in a
case not involving exactions.
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mention made of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, arguably the decision most directly implicated by the judicial
takings question (as I hope to demonstrate below), was in a foot-
note.98 As noted earlier, this failure fully to grapple with the Lin-
gle framework for regulatory takings raises several questions about
the theory of judicial takings endorsed by the plurality. In consid-
ering these questions, the following discussion focuses on three pri-
mary areas: (1) the relationship between judicial takings and
regulatory takings; (2) how judicial takings might fit within the Lin-
gle system; and (3) questions raised by the plurality's opinion that
will need to be addressed in future litigation.
A. The Relationship Between Judicial and Regulatory Takings
A preliminary topic of consideration is how the plurality's theory
of judicial takings relates to Lingle's doctrine of regulatory takings.
Put simply, is a judicial taking a species of regulatory taking or is it
a different animal? Although Stop the Beach does not give a defin-
itive answer to this question, it strongly suggests that a judicial tak-
ing is either a type of regulatory taking or something very much
akin to it.
The evidence for this conclusion is in Justice Scalia's discussion
of what government actions qualify as takings. As explained
above, the plurality opinion agreed with Lingle that "the classic
taking is a transfer of property to the State or another private party
by eminent domain."" The opinion next explained that, in addi-
tion to eminent domain, "the Takings Clause applies to other state
actions that achieve the same thing."100 As an initial matter, the
plurality seems to have set up two broad categories of conduct that
will trigger the takings protections, the first being an affirmative
exercise of eminent domain, and the second being the exercise of
governmental powers other than eminent domain that nonetheless
have results similar to it.
In this second category, Justice Scalia provided three basic exam-
ples of confiscatory action: (1) "when the government uses its own
property in such a way that it destroys private. property"; (2) when
it engages in "regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to
the classic taking," specifically permanent physical occupations and
total economic deprivations; and (3) when it "recharacterize[s] as
98 Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2603 n.6.
9 Id. at 2601.
100 Id.
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public property what was previously private property."' 0'
Although these examples might represent three distinct subcatego-
ries of government action, they nonetheless bear clear similarities
to each other.
First, and most obvious, they constitute something other than the
overt condemnation of property via eminent domain. Second, the
categories of government action underlying these examples - i.e.,
the government's use of its own property, the government's regula-
tory activity under the police power, and the government's
recharacterization of property interests - do not necessarily result
in a taking of private property every time they occur. A cursory
review of the Court's own precedent reveals that the government
undoubtedly has the ability to use its own property, engage in regu-
latory activity, and redefine certain property interests without
always having to pay compensation as a result. By contrast, com-
pensation is required in every instance in which the government
exercises its eminent domain power.
A final point of similarity is that the cases cited by Justice Scalia
for the first and third examples readily fit within Lingle's analyses
for regulatory takings. For the first example - i.e., government
using its own property in a way that takes property from another -
the plurality cited United States v. Causby and Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co.10 2 In Causby, the Court held that the government had
effected a taking by its use of nearby land for an airport, which
resulted in regular air flights over the plaintiff's parcel at signifi-
cantly low altitudes.o 3 Explaining that a "landowner owns at least
as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in
connection with the land,"104 the Court held that the government's
"continuous invasions" of airspace at such low altitudes were
equivalent to invasions of the surface itself.10 5  Similarly, in
Pumpelly, the Court held that the flooding of the plaintiff's land in
connection with building a dam qualified as a sufficient invasion to
amount to a taking of property. 10 6 Thus, both cases can be classi-
fied as involving a permanent physical invasion or occupation of
private property, falling within the Loretto category of the Lingle
analytical framework. Indeed, they have been understood this way
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) and Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872)).
103 Causby, 328 U.S. at 258.
104 Id. at 264.
105 Id. at 265.
106 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181.
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by the Court itself.107 Additionally, Pumpelly might be viewed as
involving a Lucas-style total taking inasmuch as the Court empha-
sized that the flooding "effectively destroy[ed]" the economic use-
fulness of the parcel.108
For its third example - i.e., government recharacterization of pri-
vate property as belonging to the public - the plurality cited
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith.109 That case
involved the ownership of interest that accrued on an interpleaded
fund paid into a state court's registry. Construing a state statute,
the state court held that the interest belonged to the government.
The Supreme Court concluded that the statute, so construed,
amounted to a taking because it broke with the ordinary rule that
the owners of the principal also own the interest that accrues on
that principal." 0 Changing that rule so that the interest now
belonged to the public, whether the change was accomplished leg-
islatively by the statut'e or judicially by the state court's interpreta-
tion of the statute, amounted to an uncompensated taking."'
Clearly, the same result could have been reached under the Lingle
analyses. As with Causby and Pumpelly, Beckwith could be
deemed to involve a permanent physical occupation of the prop-
erty at issue - i.e., the interest. Normally, that property would be
titled in the owner of the principal, but now it was titled in (and
physically appropriated by) the government. Indeed, the Court's
opinion suggested as much, explaining that the government's
"appropriation of the beneficial use of the fund [i.e., the interest
earned] is analogous to the appropriation of the use of private
property in United States v. Causby."'12
These similarities among the examples proffered by the plurality
suggest that they all should be classified under a broad umbrella
characterized by government conduct that is not itself condemna-
tion by eminent domain, but is nonetheless functionally equivalent
to condemnation by eminent domain. And "functional equiva-
lence" seems to center on the Lingle framework, consisting princi-
107 The Court has described or cited to Causby as a physical invasion case on numerous
occasions. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430-31 (1982); Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978). The Court has
described Pumpelly in similar terms. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 at 427.
108 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181.
109 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2601-02..
110 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162-63 (1980).
In Id. at 164.
112 Id. at 163-64.
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pally of permanent physical invasions and total economic
deprivations. Inasmuch as courts ordinarily do not possess the
power to condemn property, judicial action that qualifies as a tak-
ing would equally fall under this umbrella. Moreover, the Stop the
Beach plurality made clear that challenged judicial action was to be
addressed on the same footing as challenged actions by the other
two branches." 3 And it did so via an oblique reference to the Lin-
gle framework: "If a legislature or a court declares that what was
once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has
taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appro-
priated it or destroyed its value by regulation."'1 4
In sum, Stop the Beach appears to demarcate two broad catego-
ries of government conduct that might trigger the Takings Clause.
Within the second category, the plurality's examples bear striking
similarities to one another, and can all be analyzed using the Lingle
framework. Judicial takings appear to fall within this second cate-
gory, and the plurality suggested as much when it equated judicial
takings with permanent physical occupations and total economic
deprivations. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to analyze
judicial takings as if they are a species of regulatory taking, mean-
ing they are to be analyzed with reference to the doctrinal and ana-
lytical framework established by Lingle.
B. How Do Judicial Takings Fit Within the Lingle Analyses?
Having determined that judicial takings should fall in the same
analytical camp as regulatory takings, the problem becomes how
the former fit within Lingle's system for the latter. The plurality
paid no real attention to this problem, and its discussion of judicial
takings provides little guidance. Indeed, in this regard, Justice
Scalia's opinion seems to raise more questions than it answers.
We should begin with what the plurality did say. According to
Justice Scalia, the ultimate measure of whether a taking occurred
was whether the Florida Supreme Court deprived the beachfront
owners of an established property right. 1 5 At the end of day, the
Court concluded that no such deprivation occurred because the
rights at issue were not clearly established by prior Florida prece-
dent.' 16 But consider an alternative hypothetical. With all other
facts staying the same as those in Save the Beach, suppose that a
113 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
114 Id. at 2602 (second emphasis added).
115 See id. at 2608 n.9, 2612-13.
116 Id. at 2611-13.
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prior decision of the Florida Supreme Court unambiguously held
that sudden changes in the shoreline caused by the government
should be treated as accretions rather than avulsions, so that both
the newly deposited land and any future accretions would be titled
in the private beachfront owner. Then, suppose that in Stop the
Beach itself, the Florida Supreme Court overruled this prior deci-
sion and held that these types of changes are more properly consid-
ered to be avulsions, so that title to the newly deposited land
remains in the state. According to the plurality, this hypothetical
situation would have qualified as a taking.
But what part of the Lingle analyses would recommend that
result? Because neither our hypothetical nor the real case involved
an exaction, Lingle's standard analysis seemingly would apply. The
first step in that analysis, as explained earlier, is to ascertain
whether the government's conduct resulted in a permanent physi-
cal invasion or occupation. The Stop the Beach owners argued that
this was indeed the case, 17 but the argument is not very convinc-
ing. Although the restoration statute ostensibly changed the
boundary between the public beach and the private lots from the
MHWL to the erosion control line, it was undisputed that the ero-
sion control line (i.e., the new boundary) was fixed at the MHWL
(i.e., the old boundary).' 1 8 Thus, the physical boundaries of the
owners' lots after the restoration project and litigation were identi-
cal to the physical boundaries before the restoration project and
litigation. Moreover, neither the restoration project nor the state
court's decision (either in the actual litigation or in our hypotheti-
cal) opened those lots to governmental or third-party access in any
way different from the pre-existing relationships. In short, the
physical land itself remained the same, and the owners seemed to
concede as much. Their real complaint was not that they held less
dirt than they did previously, but that they no longer held water-
front property with the contingent possibility of obtaining more
dirt in the future.' 19 Thus, the government did not invade or
117 Brief for Petitioner at 51-58, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 2509219.
118 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600 n.2.
119 See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151) (complaining that owners no longer held littoral
or waterfront property, but not that they owned less physical property); cf Walton County
v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1112 (Fla. 2008) ("The right to
accretion . . . is a contingent, future interest that only becomes a possessory interest if and
when land is added to the upland by accretion . . . .").
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occupy their parcels; rather, it "invaded" and "occupied" one of
the intangible property rights appurtenant to those parcels.
On the other hand, one might argue that the appropriation of
these intangible rights is essentially the same as a physical occupa-
tion. Inasmuch as both situations involve the government appro-
priating rights that formerly were private, perhaps they should be
equated. But this argument seems to lie outside the bounds of
existing takings doctrine. The two categories of "per se" takings
endorsed by Lingle - permanent physical invasions and total eco-
nomic deprivations - are given that status because of their severe
effects on the core property rights of exclusion, possession, use,
and disposition. 12 0 The same cannot be said for the appropriation
in our hypothetical. Although the state judicial decision (which
recharacterized what were accretions to now be avulsions) appro-
priates something that previously was private, the core property
rights in the parcel nonetheless remain largely intact. It is no
answer that the recharacterization destroyed the individual right at
issue because, as will be explained more fully below, the Court has
repeatedly indicated that the test for whether a taking occurred is
to evaluate the government's effect on the entire "bundle of sticks"
held by the owner, and not just the individual "stick" that is most
directly impacted. For these reasons, even in our hypothetical situ-
ation, the first step in the Lingle framework favors the government.
Lingle's standard analysis next asks whether the government has
deprived the private owner of all economically beneficial use of his
property. The answer to this question, of course, depends on how
one defines the "property" at issue. In the context of our hypo-
thetical, the "property" theoretically could be either the entire par-
cel held by each owner or each owner's distinct rights to accreted
land. If the former definition prevailed, the owners would be hard
pressed to claim a total economic deprivation because their lots
would retain substantial economic value. If the rights to accretion
could be segmented, however, the owners' would have a viable
claim because those rights, now eliminated, would be worth noth-
ing. But the Lingle framework strongly indicates that this type of
120 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (stating that
total economic deprivation "is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation") and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 435-36 (1982) (explaining how a permanent physical occupation "destroys each of
these rights"); see also Kent, supra note 8, at 89-92 (discussing how core property rights are
affected by these actions).
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segmentation is not allowed.12' Although the Court has made
some remarks that might favor segmentation,1 22 the only authorita-
tive statement on the issue to be found in Lingle or the five deci-
sions it uniquely affirms specifically rejects such segmentation:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the char-
acter of the action and on the nature and extent of the inter-
ference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .123
Statements from other decisions are in agreement.12 4 Accord-
ingly, the relevant "property" in our hypothetical would be the
owners' lots in their entirety, and not just the rights to the accreted
land. As a result, this category, would also favor the government
and counsel against a finding that the owners' property had been
taken.125
That leaves the final step in Lingle's standard analysis - i.e., bal-
ancing the economic impact of the state court decision against the
character of the governmental action. Here, too, it is doubtful that
our hypothetical would result in a taking, unless Stop the Beach
implicitly disagrees with prior understandings of the test. Looking
first at economic impact, I have elsewhere explained that this fac-
tor seeks to discover the severity of the economic harm suffered by
the property owner as measured through the owner's own invest-
ment-backed expectations. 2 6 To qualify as a taking, the economic
harm ordinarily must be "substantial ... and not just mere diminu-
tion in value." 12 7 Again, the impact must be assessed with regard
to the parcel as a whole - that is, with regard to the entire bundle
121 See Kent, supra note 8, at 97 (interpreting Lingle's analytical system to require
assessment of economic impact with regard to entire parcel).
122 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (1992) (indicating lack of clarity over how to
define "property" against which economic loss is to be measured); see also Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (admitting "past discomfort" with parcel as whole
doctrine).
123 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
124 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 327 (2002).
125 This seems typical of most judicial takings in that most court decisions are unlikely to
devalue an entire parcel completely. Rather, as in our hypothetical, they are more likely to
eliminate, alter, or redefine certain component rights that affect some percentage of the
parcel's value.
126 Kent, supra note 8, at 97-99.
127 Id. at 96-97; John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 U.C.L.A. J.
ENvrti. L. & PoL'Y 171, 178 (2005); accord Barros, supra note 10, at 350 n.44; Mark W.
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of property rights held by the owner and not simply the property
rights most directly affected. 12 8 Applying this standard to our
hypothetical, it is doubtful that the elimination of the rights to
accreted land would qualify as a sufficiently severe economic
impact when viewed against the remaining value of the parcel.
This is true even if the owners' individual expectations may have
been thwarted. Although the Court has not thoroughly explained
the expectations component of the analysis, it seems comparable to
the common law doctrine of vested rights.1 29 That doctrine gener-
ally "prohibits the government from imposing new regulations if
the owner has made substantial investment in reliance on the old
ones."130  Certainly, in our hypothetical situation, the owners
would have expected to receive accreted lands, and once the state
court changed the rule, those expectations would be frustrated.
But given the volatile nature of accretions and the uncertainty that
any additional land would be deposited either naturally or by the
government, it seems unlikely that any individual owner would
have relied heavily on these rights in making his or her investment.
Of course, each case is different and, conceivably, such reliance
could be proved. On the whole, however, that the state court
would have frustrated expectations to contingent accretions proba-
bly is insufficient to transform an otherwise minimal economic
impact into something of constitutional magnitude (at least on the
aforementioned understanding of the expectations component).
Similarly, it is uncertain that the owners in our hypothetical situ-
ation would fare well under the character factor. This is true pri-
marily because it remains uncertain exactly what the character
factor seeks to measure. I previously have posited that the charac-
ter factor should be viewed primarily in terms of physical inva-
sion.13 1  Under this view, the more the government's action
resembles a physical invasion of the parcel, even if that invasion is
temporary or incomplete, the closer it will be to a taking.'3 2 Other
scholars have made the case that the character factor, even after
Lingle, continues to evaluate in some measure whether the govern-
ment has acted legitimately in pursuit of an important public pur-
Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. REs. & ENVrTL. L. 1, 35
(2006).
128 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
129 See Kent, supra note 8, at 98; see also Cordes, supra note 128, at 38.
130 Kent, supra note 8, at 98.
131 Id. at 99-100.
132 Id. at 100.
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pose.13 3 Neither of these views would provide much help to the
owners in our hypothetical. As explained above, there does not
seem to be anything approaching a physical invasion of the owners'
parcels. Nor would it appear that the state court was acting illegiti-
mately or for an invalid purpose in recharacterizing the rights at
issue. The state court would seem to be on firm footing in describ-
ing a sudden deposit of sediment, even if accomplished by the gov-
ernment, as an avulsion rather than an accretion because this
better accords with the common law definitions. Moreover, it eas-
ily could be argued that the purpose underlying the state court's
action would be to provide more flexibility to the government in
dealing with the environmental consequences of eroded beaches,
and it seems unlikely that this purpose would be deemed insub-
stantial or that the state court's decision was not legitimately
related to it.
On the other hand, it might be contended that such policy con-
siderations are more properly advanced by the legislatures than the
courts, rendering the character of the judicial action suspect under
a separation-of-powers theory. A similar argument was advanced
by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion, and he thought the
claim better analyzed under the Due Process Clause (which more
directly concerns the legitimacy of government action). 1 3 4 The plu-
rality rejected this idea on the grounds that it would "impose judi-
cially crafted separation-of-powers limitations upon the States,"
which "have nothing whatever to do with the protection of individ-
ual rights that is the object of the Due Process Clause.""'
Whether the plurality would be more willing to impose such limita-
tions under the character factor remains to be seen, although the
outlook is doubtful in light of the plurality's statement that separa-
tion-of-powers principles do not constitutionally bind the states.'3 6
Rendering this possibility equally doubtful is the plurality's sugges-
tion that due process simply does not protect economic liberties.3
We are left with the nagging impression that the judicial nature
of the conduct matters in some unstated way. This impression
results from the fact that, in our hypothetical, the plurality's rule
would have resulted in a finding that the state court took the own-
133 See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 128, at 205-07; Fenster, supra note 50, at 560-61; R.S.
Radford, Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on Regulatory Takings
Law, 38 URn. LAW. 437, 449-50 (2006).
134 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 2605.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2606.
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ers' property, even though that result cannot be explained through
existing regulatory takings analysis as expressed by Lingle. Had
the legislature or an administrative agency eliminated the right to
accretions, Lingle would have governed the analysis and, as
demonstrated, probably would have resulted in a decision for the
government. Why the result should change when the judicial
branch eliminates those rights is not explained in the plurality's
opinion.
C. Implications for Future Cases
The failure to offer this explanation raises a host of unanswered
questions that diminish the clarity promised by Lingle. Depending
on the answers, these questions have the potential to transform
certain aspects of takings doctrine.
The first category of questions relates to the future stability of
the analytical system endorsed by Lingle. One of Lingle's
strengths was that it offered a systematic (albeit imperfect) way of
thinking about and classifying takings claims, promising more clar-
ity and predictability in the process. As demonstrated, even many
of the Court's older decisions, like Pumpelly, can fit within the Lin-
gle system. By failing fully to engage that system in explaining its
theory of judicial takings, the Stop the Beach plurality has cast
doubt on whether Lingle's full potential will be realized. Is the
plurality suggesting that there are other categories of government
action, aside from those identified and endorsed in Lingle, that will
qualify as a taking of private property? If so, what are the exact
parameters of these alternate categories, and how do they relate to
the Lingle framework? Is there indeed something important about
what branch of government is acting, despite the plurality's seem-
ing insistence that all three branches stand equally before the Tak-
ings Clause? Does Stop the Beach signal a return to the "muddle,"
where every takings case potentially means the advancement of a
new analytical test or the obscuring of previously-stated rules?
If we continue to assume that Lingle establishes the governing
analyses and that the branch of government doing the acting
remains irrelevant, then a second category of questions is
presented. These questions revolve almost entirely around the
meaning of the Penn Central balancing test because under the
existing framework, that is the test under which the type of judicial
taking theorized by the plurality most easily fits. The plurality
expressed concern over a judicial decision that eliminates previ-
ously established property rights. It should be rare when a judicial
[Vol. 29:143166
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decision accomplishes this through a permanent physical invasion
or the eradication of all economically beneficial use. 1 3 8 Rather, the
more typical case will involve a judicial decision that abolishes or
alters some lesser component of the property owner's bundle, such
as the rights to accretion at issue in Stop the Beach. In such a con-
text, at least under the current system, Penn Central balancing gov-
erns the analysis. In light of Stop the Beach, future cases may be
forced to answer several outstanding questions about that balanc-
ing. For example, how much economic impact is sufficient to trig-
ger a taking? Prior decisions suggest it must be near absolute, but
Stop the Beach might suggest otherwise. How do we measure that
impact? Prior decisions indicate that we measure it against the
value of the entire parcel rather than segmenting out certain rights,
but perhaps Stop the Beach signals a change here as well. What
precise role is played by the property owner's investment-backed
expectations? Existing doctrine suggests that it is similar to the
common law doctrine of vested rights, but Stop the Beach may be
suggesting something else. Does the branch of government accom-
plishing the alleged taking matter to these expectations? What
about the character factor; what exactly is the subject of evaluation
under that portion of the test? Several theories have been posited
by commentators, but none of them seems adequately to explain
the theory of judicial takings in Stop the Beach. Is the plurality
indicating that "appropriative" actions are suspect, while "regula-
tory" actions are not? If so, what exactly is the difference between
the two? Is this where the branch of government doing the acting
comes into play? These are the types of questions invited by Stop
the Beach and are likely to be raised in future litigation.
A final category of questions concerns the not-quite-settled rela-
tionship between takings doctrine and due process. Lingle sug-
gested that the two were separate inquiries, with due process
focused on the legitimacy of the government's action and takings
focused on the burdens such action imposes on private property.
Under Lingle's economy, due process challenges to the govern-
ment action are "logically prior to and distinct from" whether a
taking has occurred,' 3 9 and such challenges are to be evaluated by
138 Of course, if the plurality was implicitly signaling a change in the parcel as a whole
doctrine, so that the measure of economic impact now is the discrete property rights
affected by the state's action, Lucas might be relevant in that the discrete rights at issue
might be totally destroyed by the state court's decision.
139 Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
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giving "deference to legislative judgments."14 0 Thus, Lingle left
open the possibility that a sufficiently arbitrary or ineffectual gov-
ernment action against property might be unconstitutional under
principles of due process, whether that action ultimately effected a
taking or not. And Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lingle -
which explained that "[t]he failure of a regulation to accomplish a
stated or obvious objective would be relevant" to a due process
challenge - made that possibility slightly stronger.141 The plurality
opinion in Stop the Beach, however, seems to close the door on
meaningful due process challenges by suggesting that economic lib-
erties are not protected under the Due Process Clause.1 42
Although the plurality indicated that such a result may not be
entirely logical, it nonetheless seemed to adhere to that result,
describing Justice Kennedy's use of due process in the present case
as "propel[ling] us back to what is referred to (usually deprecat-
ingly) as 'the Lochner era."" 4 3 In light of these statements, it
remains uncertain whether a property owner really has any chance
of succeeding on a due process claim, regardless of which branch of
government is acting and irrespective of the potential variations in
deference that might be owed to the different branches. It may be
that takings doctrine forms a property owner's sole constitutional
remedy against deprivations of her property rights, raising the
stakes for the doctrinal questions posed above.14 4 On the other
hand, Justice Kennedy was alone in his concurrence in Lingle,
while his concurrence in Stop the Beach was joined by Justice
Sotomayor. Perhaps his view of due process as a protector of prop-
erty rights is gaining ground. The ultimate resolution to this impor-
tant question, like those above, will have to await future litigation.
CONCLUSION
The plurality's opinion in Stop the Beach, which seeks to clarify
the previously ambiguous theory of judicial takings, ultimately
raises more questions than it answers. By failing to situate its the-
140 Id. at 545.
141 Id. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 ("tWie have held for many years (logically or not)
that the 'liberties' protected by Substantive Due Process do not include economic
liberties.").
143 Id.
144 See James W. Ely, Jr., "Poor Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the Van-
ishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004-2005 CATO Sur. Cr. REV. 39, 52 (2005) (comment-
ing that "[f]ederal courts no longer provide even cursory property rights review under due
process").
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ory of judicial takings into the larger doctrine of regulatory takings
established in Lingle, the plurality potentially has undone much of
the progress made by that earlier decision. To fit judicial takings as
explained in Stop the Beach within the Lingle framework will
necessitate the answering of several doctrinal and analytical ques-
tions, and until those questions are answered, the result promises
to be a less clear takings doctrine and a more volatile environment
for future litigation.
